Properties of a price dependent rationing scheme are formula ted which can handle constrained flexible prices as well as fDred prices. This scheme is applied to prove the existence of an equil! brium which generalizes Benassy' s concept of K-equilibrium.
. Hahn (22) and B�hm and Levine (9) . Most of these advances a� sume fixed prices, the rationale for this going back to Leijonhuf vud1s reinterpretation of Keynes as including an inversion of the marshallian assumptions on the relative speeds of adjustment of prices and quantities (cfr. Leijonhufvud (25) , Chapter II: 1). So me of those papers introduce price setting agents (Benassy (3), Grandmont and Laroque (2 0), Hahn (22» , along lines similar to the pioneering works of Bushaw and Clower (10) and Negishi (27) . Al though some papers allow for price flexibility without price set ting (Dreze (17) and Part 2 of Grandmont and Laroque (20» the ge neral tendency is to try to escape from the unrealistic walrasian auctioneer who directs the process of tatonnement and recontracting.
On the other hand, a great number of macroeconomic models have appeared in recent years which use the quantity rationing proach. Among these are: Malinvaud (26) , Varian (29) , Dixit ap (15) , Negishi (28) , Hool (24) and Benassy (6) . Whereas again the fixpri ce approach is dominant, in some papers some prices are assumed to be flexible enough to clear the market within the period although the process by wich prices adjust is usually not made explicit.
It seems to us that the walrasian auctioneer can certainly not be defended on the grounds of realism. However, if a convenient me thad of dealing with price rigidities is found, the fictitiouS auctioneer can be seen as a convenient device for constructing sta tic non-walrasian macroeconomic models in which someprices are re garded as having a sufficiently high speed of adjustment whereas o! thers have a very low one. This, of course, depends on the defini tion of the unit period. Given the unit period, one may convenien tly polarize goods into two categories: those which are flexprice (although possibly within certain lower and upper bounds) and tho se which are fixprice. The former may be viewed as having highly efficient price setters (with very low price setting costs) who manage to eq uate supply and demand instantaneously. But, of course, these are effective supplies and demands which include spillovers from markets with constrained prices. A formal way of representing these highly efficent price setting activities is the typical ta tonnement with recontracting. On the other hand, fixed prices may be explicitly set by price setting agents whose minimum priCing p� riod is the unit p�riod. One of these agents may be a government with price regulating activities which may fix or index some pri ces or establish maximum or minimum prices.
Markets with fixed or indexed prices should clear within the period by quantity rationing. Markets with flexible prices should clear by price adjustment if this is possible. 1f constraints on price movements impede the market from clearing by price adjust ments only, then quantity rationing should also take place. There fore, the auctioneer which centralizes the negotiations in the flex price markets can be seen as having a price dependent rationing scheme in addition to the usual price manipulating function.
In the present paper we formalize this by constructing a pri ce dependent rationing scheme which is a generalization of the fixprice rationing scheme proposed by Benassy (2) . Also, we apply this scheme in proving the existence of what we call a Generalized Benassy Equ ilibrium. The latter is a generalization of Benassy' s concept of K-equilibrium which allows for price flexibilities and uses the concept of Generalized Effective Demands as proposed in
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe the economy and make a brief description of the price-setting de cisions for fixed prices. In Section 3 we define a compact and con vex set of admissible prices. In Section 4 we define the rationing scheme and show a method for constructing one. In Section 5 we de fine the concept of Generalized Effective Demand and in Section 6
we define the concept of Generalized Benassy Equilibrium and state a theorem concerning its existence, leaving the proof for Section 7. In Section 8 we prove that the theorem still holds upon the relaxation of the restrictive assumptions of compactness and vexity on the set of admissible prices. The organization of the economy is as in the hicks ian "week".
THE ECONOMY
Transactions are made on l I Mondaytl. production)
takes place during the rest of the week. However, in contrast to
Hick's method of temporary competitive eq uilibrium we will draw on the monopolistic price-setting framework developed by Bushaw and Clower (10), Negishi (27) and Benassy (3 ) . Some agentes will be price takers in all markets. Others will be price setters in certain markets and price takers in the rest. As in Hicks (23 ) , the week will be suffi!=!iently short so that price variations during the week may be neglected. But in our context this will mean that fixed prices will remain fixed throughout all of Monday (in which transactions take place) and the rest of the week (in which no transactions take place) . On the other hand, as in Hicks, we will assume that flexible prices adjust instantaneusly on Monday so as to clear the markets as much as existing price constraints permit, the rest of the market-clearing process relying on quantity ratio ning. Hence, there will be a process of tatonnement in flex-price markets with recontracting until the markets clear. Furthermore, we will admit institutional (or political) price rigidities. Some prices may be fixed by the government! others may be indexed to so me subset of the remaining prices, others may have a maximum or a minimum which may, in turn, be indexed.
Before going to the markets, price setters must have detercharge for the week. Let H i C G be the mined the prices they will set of goods controlled by i. Let p = (P i ' P i ) where P i his the setting decision may be represented by the
where P is the set of prices which incorporates political regidi ties. The solution to this program is P i
) is a (possibly multi-valued) vector of tentative de mands which are not actually expressed. P i (P i I z i ) ' which we will assume is a singleton, is the vector of prices controlled by i which will hold for the week.
3.

THE SET OF ADMISSI8LE PRICES
We will use a general version of the set of admissible prices which incorporates fixed and indexed prices as well as (possibly� dexed) maximum or minimum prices: 5. If R (p) = 0, some P, then the same equality holds for -g all p.
We will later relax assumption �.
Lemma 1 Under R1 -R3 P is non-empty, compact, and convex. Let r.h.P (r.i. p) denote the relative boundary (interior) of P with respect to R: ' and let H denote the set of goods for which R (p) = R (p). We will call the goods in H, fixprice goods and the -g 9 goods in G _ H, flexprice goods.
By R4, H is independent of p and all fixprice goods have positive prices. Obviously I U H i C H.
4.
THE RATIONING SCHEME 
Furthermore, we will assume that the functions F i g have the follo
wing properties:
F2 and F3 are typical conditions of "voluntary exchangel l "long side rationing", respectively. F4a says that demanders can't be rationed when the price is far from its maximun and F4b that supliers can't be rationed whenever the price is far from its mini mum or has zero as its minimum. Hence by F4 quantity rationing can take place only when rationing by price adjustment is no longer possible. By F5a (PSc) the aggregate rationed demand must be n O n -negative (non-positive) when the price is at its minimum (maximum), if this minimum is positive. By F5b, (F 5c) rationing must preserve aggregate excess supply (demand) when the price is near but not on its minimum (maximum) . Notice that by continuity
O.
> g
Also, by FSa and FSc, for gsH we have
The typical rationing scheme of fix price theory satisfies condi tions E:..J. . , F2, F3 and (1) (cfr. Benassy (2». Hence, our rationing scheme is a generalization of the fix price rationing scheme which allows price flexibility. When �(p) :: R (p) (and hence H = G) we have the fixprice rationing scheme as a special case. On the other hand, when �(p) :: 0 and R (p) :: +00 (a possibility that will be adm! tted in section 8) no quantity rationing is permitted (by F4) and
we're in a walrasian context.
At first sight, the number of conditions we have imposed on the rationing functions F. might seem appaling. But actually it is 1 9 a large class. To prove this we will describe a method for trans forming any fixprice F2, F3 and (1» into that satisfies �).
rationing scheme (i.e. one that satisfies �, a fixflexprice rationing scheme (i.e. one ** Let Z ig be the rationed demands that correspond a fix-price rationing scheme. 
5.
GENERALIZED EFFECTIVE DEMANDS
Agents do not have complete information on the existing rati £ ning scheme. However, they may expect to be rationed in one or more markets if they express demands above their perceived constrains Z ig not manipulate
the outcome
We assume that agents believe they can of the rationing scheme by deliberately over or underbidding. Consequently, given his effective demand z. '9 and his perceived constraints Z ig ' we assume that iTs expected transaction has the simple form max Furthermore, we assume that iTs perceived constra� nts Z. are them '9 selves functions of whatever information he has on the price ve� Agents choose their effective demands so as to maximize the utility of the outcome they expect as in Benassy (4) and B8hm and Levine (9) . (The latter assume that the agents have perfect know-ledge on the rationing scheme and the other agents effective de mands) . Hence, ils Generalized Effective Demand, e i {s i ) is the so lution to the following program:
For simplicity, \ve assume that an ag ent always expresses effective demands which are in Z i -By assumption .Il., e i ( P r z i ) is multivalued. Notice that even if U i were strictly quasi-concave e i (p, z i ) would -5 -in general be multivalued, e.g. Z ig
-6 E e ig (p, z i ) whenever 
Hence, the vector of Benassy Effective Demands e�(s. ) is formed > > by the solution to G different such programs. Benassy proves that if U i is strictly quasi-concave, such demands (which he calls Clo wer demands) also belong to the correspondin g Generalized Effecti ve Demands (cfr. Benassy (2) and Grandmont (19» . Therefore, we are working in a rather general framework.
GENERALIZED BENASSY EQUILIBRIUM
In this section we will define a generalization of Benassy's concept of K -equilibrium and state a Theorem concernin g the exis tence of such equilibria.
Definition 1) A Generalized Benassy Equilibrium (G.B.E. ) with respect to (P,
z. i E I l i E I * 2) A GEE without quantity rationing is a G.B" .E. in which z z. * A strict GBE is a GBE in which there is rationing (z # z).
We will say that (P, z) defines a G.B.E. if {P I 2, G(p, z) , .. U Since Dreze's paper deals specifically with uniform rationing ("absolute constraints on net trades") he did not distinguish actual rationing from per ceived rationing. Other authors. upon reinterpreting Dreze's Concept of equI librium for more general rationing schemes (cfr. Grandmont (19) , Grandmont and Laroque (20)) have interpreted his condition (iii) as saying that tlonly traders on one side of the market for commodity h may perceive binding Cons traints" (Gran dmont (19) . p.SS8) .. I have not followed this interpretation.
ning is allowed unless price rigidities are binding" and holds in our case by the follavling Lemma.
< R g (pi -k g {p) I then for all Z ig " 0 (by F41 and for all z 0 (by F21,
l:
In this case, demanders cannot be rationed by F3. But suppliers cannot be rationed by F4b nor can agents with zero net demands by F2. Hence, no a g ent can be rationed. By a symetrical argument, no agent can be rationed if �(p) < P g < Bg(p) + �(p) .
Q.E.D.
We will presently define a correspondence which may be inter preted as a simultaneous tatonnement on prices and quantities. As we will prove in Theorem Ir a fixed point of this correspondence d� fines a G.B.E.
Pr Z = max _ g P r m�n 9 P r P g + 9 isI 1 9 Pr 9 where P g is a positive constant. Alsor let
Then the following theorem holds Theorem I
1. E has a fixed point.
2.
(P, z) defines a G. B. E. if and only if it is a fixed point of E.
3. If (P, z) defines a G. B.E., and P E: r.LP then (PI z) defines a G. B. E. without quantity rationing. is a G. B. E. without quantity rationing.
As an obvious Corollary to Theorem 1.3, we have:
Corollary if (P, z) defines a strict G.B.E. then p £ r.b.F.
PROOF OF THEOREM I
1. a) Q is non-empty, convex and compact since so are P (by Lemma 1) and Z i (by assumption Q) bl E is u.s.c. , h is continuous I since so are F. -
set and therefore n i is U. S. c. It follows is u.s. 
) is convex. In that case, z(c) £ e i (P , Z i )' But the inclusion holds, since if we assume that z� � z� , we have:
Hence, f 1 (p , z) is convex and we have all the conditions needed to apply Kakutani I s fixed point theorem.
2. Assume that (p O " z o ) defines a G.B.E. Then, is particular, 
we obtain
. By an argument symmetrical to thatof 3. This is a direct consequence of Lemma 3 since, if p £ r.i.P.
then for all 9 either 0 < B g {p) < P g < R g {P) or a £ P g < R g {P) . 8.
NON-CONVEXITY AND NON-COMPACTNESS OF P
In this section we will weaken assumption R2 so that �(p) and -R(pl may be non-convex and R(p) not bounded. As for convexity,nQ tice that in order to apply Kakutani's Fixed Point Theorem P need not be convex but merely homeomorphic to a convex set. Accordingly, let us call B' 1 assumption R whith R2 replaced by R'2 P is homeomorphic to a convex set and B(p) is bounded.
To deal withi a possibly non-compact P we use a technique similar to that used by Drez e (17) 
where K is a positive constant.
We will now prove that p k is a bounded sequence. Assume that But then by F3 no demander is rationed.
Hence (Z� g ) q :(Z ig ) q , Vi, ¥g, and we have the contradiction In either case, Theorems I and II still hold. In the proof of Theorem I we may in these cases rely on Brouwer's Fixed Point
Theorem.
